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If the Senegalese youth have, in majority, always
manifested great fervour for their religion by strong
involvement in t u r u q,1 it seems that today they are
rather investing their energies in the new Islamic
movements that are specific branches of their origi-
nal Sufi orders. While retaining close ties with and
even reproducing the teachings of the latter, these
movements address a specifically targeted audience
Ð urban youth.
Youth, Sufism,
and Politics
in Senegal
Islam in Senegal, by virtue of its historical
implantation, is generally practised within
the t u r u q, the greatest numbers of followers
of which belong to the Tijaniyya and the
Mouridis. For more than a century, re-
searchers have shown particular interest in
the latter, indigenous to Wolof territory and
fascinating for its economic activism and its
capacity to adapt itself to social change.
However, the Tijaniyya, originating in the
Maghreb and divided over several
marabout families in Senegal, remains the
t a r i q a with the most adepts.
The Dahiratoul Moustarchidina wal
Moustarchidaty, gathering at its base young
followers of the Tijaniyya (Tijans) who have
taken an oath of allegiance to the Sy family
of Tivaouane, has set itself apart since 1993
by its political orientation. This has meant
severing ties with its affiliated brotherhood
and has transformed the Dahiratoul
Moustarchidina wal Moustarchidaty into a
politico-religious movement.
From religion to politics
The main caliphs of the Tijaniyya in Sene-
gal are all members of the Sy family, a
marabout lineage based in Tivaouane. It is
thus in this city that the Dahiratoul
Moustarchidina wal Moustarchidaty was
born in 1973. Its origins as well as its real
founders are vague and discourse on the
subject contradictory. Nonetheless, it is
highly probable that the caliph of that peri-
od, Abdoul Aziz Sy, encouraged his grand-
children to regroup themselves in a d a a i r a
to learn the Qur'an. One of the grandsons,
Moustapha Sy, moral leader of the current
movement, began to follow in this direction
in the early 1980s. In this same period, fol-
lowing the Iranian Revolution, numerous
movements of Muslim youth (notably the
Mourid youth movement) were created in
Senegal. Moustapha Sy, in response to this
competition, spread the Dahiratoul
Moustarchidina wal Moustarchidaty
throughout the territory (from then on the
d a a i r a became a genuine movement) more
particularly in Dakar, where he established
his headquarters. He created a pyramid-
shaped hierarchy. Moustapha Sy, uncon-
tested leader aided by his advisors, lead his
followers with extreme precision in his
teachings (e.g. the way one was to dress and
to behave). His orders were transmitted to
the leaders of each sector, zone and section,
from the top to the bottom of the pyramid.
Until the 1980s, the doctrine taught to
adepts was that of the Tijaniyya, and
Moustapha Sy maintained close relations
with Tivaouane from his base in Dakar. In
the early 1990s, he improved relations with
his father, Sheikh Ahmed Tidjane Sy, who, as
a result of a family disagreement, lived in
Dakar cut off from Tivaouane. Moustapha Sy
aligned himself according to the directives
of his father, who then Ð in his son's shadow
Ð became the veritable leader and was
named spiritual guide of the movement.
Since then, the line of conduct of the
Dahiratoul Moustarchidina wal Moustarchi-
daty has changed: being clearly defined as
apolitical in its preamble, it suddenly be-
came a religious movement with political
involvement. On 13 February 1993,
Moustapha Sy intervened in a meeting with
Abdoulaye Wade and declared his support
of the Senegalese Democratic Party (Parti
Dmocratique Sngalais Ð PDS) for the
presidential elections against Abdou Diouf.
His discourse was remarkable since, for the
very first time, Moustapha Sy presented
himself incontestably as a young, modern
marabout breaking with the attitudes of the
spiritual guides of Tivaouane. He involved
himself in the electoral game, haranguing
the crowd like a politician and showing a
certain attraction for reformist discourse on
Islam Ð despite his being the heir of a Sufi
t r a d i t i o n .
Since then, the leader of the Moustarchi-
dine has never left the political scene, which
was to lead to his imprisonment and the
prohibition of his movement by the govern-
ment in 1994. In 1996, he reconciled with
the Socialist Party (Parti Socialist PS) and the
d a a i r a was rehabilitated. By 1999, he had
announced his desire to found his own po-
litical party. With the Senegalese constitu-
tion not allowing religious-based parties, he
rejoined an already-existing party, the Unity
and Rally Party (Parti de l'Unit et du
Rassemblement, PUR) of the Diouf
Caliphate. He became president of the party
and declared, in January 2000, his candidacy
for the presidential elections of February
2000. But this was not to last more than
three days for Moustapha Sy immediately
retreated under the orders of his father.
Explanations of this
p o l i t i c i z a t i o n
During the reign of Ababacar, father of
Sheikh Ahmed Tidjane Sy and caliph from
1922 to 1957, serious contention broke the
Sy family in two: the father and son on one
side, openly opposed to other members of
the family, half-brothers of the caliph. This
crisis worsened with the succession to the
throne since Abdoul Aziz Sy, opposed to
Ababacar, was elected caliph. Sheikh
Ahmed Tidjane Sy, who was always consid-
ered the successor of his father, has since
unceasingly claimed his right to the
caliphate. As Villalon explains,2 his entire
marabout and political career are interpret-
ed under the angle of his will to compete
with Tivaouane by regrouping his father's
followers so as to found a sort of parallel
b r o t h e r h o o d .
The coming together of Sheikh Ahmed
Tidjane Sy and his son Moustapha was ac-
companied by the latter's break with
Tivaouane. The new political line of Dahira-
toul Moustarchidina wal Moustarchidaty
should also be understood as a strategy still
aiming to position the father in the
marabout field. In 1993, during the presi-
dential elections, Sheikh Ahmed Tidjane Sy
was removed from the public scene. Yet in
that period the caliph of the Tijans was
aging. The question of succession was soon
to be posed. Sheikh Ahmed Tidjane Sy thus
had to reinforce his marabout status in the
eyes of his followers. But his position of re-
treat prevented him from doing so. At the
same time, Moustapha Sy needed to consol-
idate his legitimacy. Allying with the oppo-
sition allowed him to re-establish ties with
urban youth, unhappy with the current
regime, and also to recruit adepts for his fa-
ther by explaining that the political posi-
tioning of the movement was a decision
emanating from Sheikh Ahmed Tidjane Sy
h i m s e l f .
The strategy of politicization brought with
it changes in the movement's proclaimed
religious education. From Tijan apprentice-
ship, strictly religious, the movement orient-
ed its teachings in such a way as to trans-
form adherents into Muslim patriots. The
latter learned to rationalize their daily acts
in order to correspond to a type of 'perfect'
behaviour and to act in service of the com-
munity. They became ambassadors of an
ideal Islamic society yet to be constructed.
The non-religious state was to be combat-
ed, society lost in Western atheism to be
changed. It became necessary to return to
the real values of Islam.
Consequences of
p o l i t i c i z a t i o n
The Dahiratoul Moustarchidina wal
Moustarchidaty is composed of two types of
followers: those from a relatively wealthy
social background and/or those with an oc-
cupation allowing them to participate in so-
cial life (artists, journalists, academics, etc.);
and those from less wealthy backgrounds
that generally have an occupation involving
them to a lesser degree in social activities.
The former, which constitute a sort of elite
within the movement, are close to
Moustapha Sy in his political choices; while
the others, who constitute the majority of
followers, are often not completely in step
with the positions assumed by their leader,
whom they have difficulty in understand-
ing. Most adepts, in fact, consider the move-
ment first and foremost of a religious nature
(which is why they adhere to it). They feel
that political matters are not of their con-
c e r n .
How can a movement, declared as politi-
co-religious by its leaders, be non-militant
at its base? How can one explain the move-
ment's incessant political turnarounds?
How can one understand its discourse,
more concerned with social aspects than
with political ones? How can one approach
such a closed movement, which threatens
its detractors while maintaining an image of
openness and tolerance? 
The attitudes and desires of the
Moustarchidine leaders are difficult to read.
However, Moustapha Sy does not seem to
genuinely want to take power. Politics
would be for him a way in which to distin-
guish himself from other religious guides
and to make himself heard at the level of the
state: the movement is composed of thou-
sands of followers Ð and thus thousands of
v o t e r s .
It is quite apparent that religious leaders
are increasingly directly involved in the po-
litical sphere in Senegal. This was confirmed
during the last presidential election: the reli-
gious discourse was extremely present dur-
ing the electoral campaign and, in addition
to Moustapha Sy, two other Muslim guides
presented their candidacies. Many wanted
to clearly demonstrate that, as citizens, they
too had the right to participate in politics.
Nevertheless, the n d i g a l s3 have never failed
as they did during the last election. It seems
that religious leaders' efforts to influence
citizenship are no longer within their reach:
following their advice, people did indeed
vote, but also demonstrated political matu-
rity by considering the act of voting as in in-
dividual act. Does the end of the n d i g a l s a l s o
mean an end to political Islam in Senegal at
the very moment that the religious leaders
are more mobilized than they have ever
been?  u
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